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Experimentation has been the foundation of pure science research since the 1 gth century. 
Experimental work in the social sciences was bom in the first part of the 2oth century from a 
desire to test hypotheses in a controlled environment (Kinder & Palfrey, 1993). By then, 
political science and economics have already completed a separation. Therefore, it is now 
difficult to find a clear and generally accepted corpus of hypotheses that could allow cornparison 
between experiments in political science and economics. 
This paper is a discussion about probability calculus. Experiments had shown that 
individuals generally miscalculate probabilities but very few insights have been given on the 
reasons behind these errors. We argue that subjective calculus is the main responsible for 
individuals' miscalculations. We argue that three factors cause this miscalculation: 
preconceived ideas, past social experience and calculus capabilities. 
The classical utility maximizing actor mode1 predicts that in absence of coercion devices 
that increase the cost of deserting, the Nash equilibrium solution to a non-cooperative voluntary 
provision of a public good is defection of every actor. This means that despite the self-interest of 
everybody to see the production of the public good, the optimal behaviour of each individual is 
to free-ride. Individual rationality is not suficient for collective action (Sandler, 1992). This 
poses an important challenge to rational choice theorists since what is called a prisoner's 
dilemma is often violated in experiments and in society. Indeed, economists and political 
scientist are now trying to craft a series of assumptions that take into account empirical and 
experimental fmding S. 
Until recently, Olson's conclusions about collective action were the best explanation 
about what was responsible of frequent failure in public good provision (Olson, 1965). During 
the nineties, Elinor Ostrom's seminal work on successful institutions gave a new birth to 
collective action studies in political science. The author defines a successful institution as an 
institution that enables individuals to achieve productive outcomes in situations where 
temptations to free-ride and shirk are ever present (Ostrom, 1990). She argued with quite 
convincing empirical examples that this kind of institution exists and can last for a long period of 
time if a series of conditions are respected. 
Experimental economics can help social scientists on this question. Experiments conduct 
in a controlled environment allow investigators to calibrate, estimate and test different 
hypotheses of their model. For the last twenty-five years, a long series of experiments have been 
conducted on voluntary provision of a public-good. We use some of their results in this paper. 
These experiments are not a panacea to every theoretical problem but we believe they are one of 
the best tools available. 
In the first part of this paper, we take a look at the fundarnentals of public provision in 
political science and economics. We define terms and concepts common to that type of 
situation. Secondly, we review some of the most important assumptions used to explain human 
behaviour in the situation of voluntary provision of public good and we present a coherent body 
of hypotheses that flow from these assumptions. We elaborate a definition of the rational actor. 
We define what we mean by utility and preference. We finally turn our attention to the subjective 
part of the decision process and to what exactly affects the decision. We argue that preconceived 
ideas, past social experiences and calculus capabilities are crucial to understand agents' 
decisions. 
In the conclusion, we give some suggestions for future experiments to improve our 
understanding of individuals' choice mechanisms. 
PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION 
Definition of a Public Good 
We defme a public good as a commodity for which use of a unit of the good by one agent 
does not preclude its use by other agents and for which it is not possible for an agent to prevent 
its use by other agents (Mas-Colell, 1995). We have here the two distinctive characteristics of a 
public good. First, its utilization by one agent doesn't obliterate or modie the good. Some 
could argue that fresh water and clean air are public goods and but that they can might from 
excessive utilization. It is true. We use that narrow definition keeping in mind that our 
experimental tools are not designed to replicate dynamics of natural resources management. 
Secondly, a public good is non-exclusive. Indeed, there is no mechanism available at 
reasonable costs to assure that only its producers are allowed to benefit from it. This 
characteristic could be a problem depending on the nature of the public good. Some public 
goods have increasing costs associated with increased consumption while others, like 
knowledge, do not suffer from increased utilization. We must make a distinction between the 
public good produced and the collective action that leads to its production. 
The utility derived from the production of a public good is inferior to the one derived 
from a private good, following this general equation for individual i: 
Where BI > 6,, B, is the strength of preference of individual i for the private good x, and 6, is the 
strength of preference of individual i for the public good Cy,. We suppose, following previous 
research in experimental economics and classical economic theory, that individuals have a strict 
preference for private consumption. Public consumption, associated with post-materialist values, 
generally arises when basic private needs are fulfilled. Also, individuals generally consider 
public consumption less attractive because they are left with the impression of having paid too 
much since ownership is shared with the whole community. Strict preference for private 
consumption is therefore realistic in our mode1 where agents don't face a surplus of revenue and 
are only concerned by their own well-being. Indeed, participants receive a limited amount of 
money in the game and do not face post-materialist values observed in wealthy and well- 
educated society. Note that utility function could be nonlinear. Using common optimization 
method, we can identiSl Nash equilibriums and a Pareto optimum. 
A Nash equilibrium is a situation where each player S strategy choice is a best response 
to the strategies actually played by his rivals (Ibid, 246). Fonnally, A strategy profile s = 
(si, .  . . ,st) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if  
Nash equilibriums exist only if a series of conditions are respected. First, we suppose cornmon 
knowledge of each others' rationality. Theoretically, this assumption seems quite obvious but it 
is constraining because, as we will see, rationality faces virulent critics particularly in political 
science. Secondly, we suppose rationalizability, which means that each agent considers that 
others take their best decision in face of a choice. Finally, we suppose that agents make the right 
evaluation of each others' payoffs. 
Pareto optimality is a central concept in microeconomics. Using individuals' utility 
maximization calculus, it is possible to find a feasible allocation Y/ that is Pareto optimal (or 
Pareto eflcient) r f  there is no other feasible allocation Y(x1, ... ,XI; yl, ... ,yJ) such that ul(x'J 2 
u~(xJ for al1 I = 1, ... ,I and ui(x'i) > u&J for some i (Ibid, 313)  . This means that, under certain 
conditions, there is an allocation of resources that is optimal for everybody in a sense that it is 
impossible to improve the well-being of one without affecting negatively the well-being of at 
least another. 
Pareto optimality has nothing to do with equity or fairness. The only criterion for 
optimality is the general well-being of the group. Classical microeconomics predicts that private 
provisions of a public good always produce an equilibrium level under the Pareto optimal level'. 
A Pareto optimal allocation (qO) must maximize aggregate surplus and respect the necessary and 
sufficient first-order condition: 
C Ui'(qO)(,  .) 5 c'(qO) with equality if qO > O 
Where c (qO) is a strictly positive and a convex cost function and qO is the Pareto optimal 
quantity. If q0 > O, we have a situation where the sum of consumers ' marginal bene$ts for the 
1 For an exhaustive proof about the inefficiency of private provision of public goods, see Mas-Colell, A., M. D. 
Whinston, and J. R Green (1995): Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 360-363.. 
public good is set equal to its marginal cost (Ibid, 361). We can also derive an optimality 
condition for the supply side of the problem where individuals participate to the production by 
purchasing the public good. Using a fixed price (p*) to compare marginal utility (profit) of 
consumer (producer) to marginal cost c'(qO(p*)), we have: 
It is impossible to reach an equilibrium between demand and supply side in a pure environment. 
It is nonetheless possible to reach a Nash equilibrium that is also Pareto optimal by modiQing 
the utility function or the cost fùnction. This is exactly what most experimenters do when they 
craft different payoff mechanisms. 
So Pareto optimality cannot be attained in a pure environment. Therefore, this level of 
provision of a public good cannot be equal to the Nash equilibrium. It can be shown that, under 
our assumptions about rational actors (self-interest, common knowledge, rationalizability, etc.), 
the Nash solution is that each agent free-rides. This conclusion is derived from the necessary 
and sufficient first-order condition of utility maximizing where: 
Consequently, the marginal utility of private consumption is positive for every x. We have a 
corner solution where every agent decides to free-ride and consume only the private good. It 
would make sense to consider that in the long run, the marginal utility of private consumption 
would get close to zero. In that case, it would be possible to reach a point where individuals 
would be indifferent between private and public consumption: 
Lim (w,,) pi - 6i = O where w is the revenue of individual i 
However, under the hypothesis that each individual has a budget constraint, this situation is 
improbable. To recapitulate, we know that the single Nash equilibrium is Yi = O and the Pareto 
optimal level of consumption of the public good is Yi = wi 1 p*. 
Definition of a Collective Action 
We define collective action as an activity that requires the coordination by two or more 
individuals whose actions are independent (Sandler, 1992). This definition alerts us to the 
importance of others' behaviour in the production of collective action. A collective action is not 
necessary successful in producing the desired public good but it is a proof of the very existence 
of a voluntary public good provision . Formation of a lobby or a conservation group generates 
cost that must be supported by its members. Experimental economics can't explain this 
collective action paradox because guaranteed remuneration is necessary to conduct experiments. 
We argue that survey analysis is a better tool to answer that peculiar question. Let just Say that 
Robert Putnam work on social capital has shown a declining but still strong engagement of 
American citizens and a significant investment in money and, to a lesser extant, time in 
collective action (Putnarn, 2000). We now have to understand its dynamics and its outcomes. 
Political scientists have quite convincingly demonstrated how important social structures, 
noms and values are in explaining agents' behaviour. Group size, group heterogeneity and 
cooperation devices are the most cited factors responsible for the presence or absence of 
collective action. Big groups tend to fail when trying to conjugate efforts to produce a collective 
outcome. Heterogeneous groups are more successful because individuals with very intense 
preference for the public good will burden costs more heavily to reach their objectives. Long- 
standing cheap devices are more efficient than short-term costly policies (Marwell, 1993). 
Social pressures and an acquired sense of duty can affect quite heavily individuals' behaviour 
despite infinitesimal risks of being caught while being anti-social. But much work needs to be 
done to understand what is happening between small groups7 apparent success and large groups' 
predicted failure. We argue that group size is a significant but indirect explanatory factor of 
individuals' behaviour because of its consequences on calculus complexity. 
Economists believe that agents infer others' utility function on the basis of available 
comprehensible information and use this estimation in their calculus. Agents are also able to 
evaluate others' discount rate and their perceptions of threats. We argue that individuals will try 
to infer others' behaviour using an aggregated proxy instead of multilevel complex calculus. It 
is a lot simpler and less costly. In short, we have a general definition of public goods, a 
preference for private consumption and a predicted behaviour: free-riding. We also know that, 
without institutional devices, the outcome is not Pareto optimal. We now turn our attention to 
the rational actor mode1 to understand how agents7 calculate. 
Rationality has been defined in many different ways In political science, emphasis is put 
on the effect of rationality on the political output. It is quite rare for a political scientist to make 
explicit hypotheses on such questions as perfect information, risk averseness or preference 
convexity. It doesn't mean that they neglect that part of the process but rather that their analysis 
generally doesn't require complex modeling. 
However, there are some subfields of political science where forma1 modeling is present 
(Austin-Smith, 2000). Political behaviour is particularly fertile in terms of debates and theories 
about the validity of rational choice. The paradox of voting is a good example of limits of 
rational choice2. Since the marginal effect of voting in a sufficiently large group election is 
almost zero and there is a cost associated with the action of voting (time, information gathering, 
etc.), a rational actor would have no reason to participate in this activity. However, a majority of 
eligible citizens do vote at each election 
Economists are also preoccupied by the outcome of rational calculus but the process 
receives more attention. Following Kaushik Basu's definition, a person is taken to be rational i f  
that person, given his information, chooses the action that maximizes his objective, whatever that 
objective happens to be (Basu, 2003). There are three major parts in that definition. First, 
incomplete information is possible and exogenous in the rational actor model. Secondly, 
rationality supposes maximization under constraints by the actor. A rational actor does not only 
maximize her own benefits facing a static environment but she also takes into account other's 
benefits and objectives. Finally, rational objectives don7t have to comfort exogenous beliefs of 
what seems best for an individual from an outside look. Social noms, but also erroneous 
common sense, must be workable within the rational actor model. 
Utilitv, Preferences and Decision 
The concept of utility has taken a central place in microeconornic theory. Despite its 
vagueness, utility has nonetheless the advantage of being flexible in term of definition. In 
experimental economics, money is the indirect measure of utility for participants. Unfortunately, 
2 For good reviews on the question, see Blais, A. (2000): To Vote or Not to Vote; the Merits and Limits of Rational 
Choice Theory. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press and Green, D. P., and 1. Shapiro (1994): Pathologies of 
Rational Choice,Theory; a Crihque ofApplicatons in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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this proxy brings some problems and we must accept constraining hypotheses to continue Our 
investigation. 
The first of these hypotheses is that every individual gets the same utility from money. It 
is easy to imagine two rational individuals who don't give the same value to a hundred dollars. 
Despite the fact that these two individuals could buy the same amount of goods with this money, 
the opportunity cost of that consumption can take a wide range of values, particularly when there 
is heterogeneity in ability and endowrnent. For example, someone who owns enough money to 
live comfortably for the rest of her life certainly doesn't give the same intrinsic value to one 
hundred dollars than the one who barely has enough to pay his bills at the end of the month. 
This heterogeneity causes major problems when it comes to modeling because extending our 
mode1 in NxN dimensions to allow different utility function forms for every individual would 
cause technical problems in the maximization process. As we see, this first hypothesis that we 
call comparable utility of money is the least of two evils. We will assume: 
Ui(xi) = Uj(xj) for 'v' { i j  & Ui(yi) + Uj(yj) if i t j 
Our second hypothesis is about the marginal utility of money as a function of the 
reference point. We mean by this the assumption that the utility of a marginal increase of 
revenue is a function of one's reference point (Kahneman, 1979). Indeed, utility gain from 
money becomes smaller and smaller as this gain gets further away of this reference point. This 
finding implies that while people are likely to be risk averse over gains, they are often risk- 
loving over losses (Rabin, 1998). Limited resources available to conduct research oblige 
experimenter to cap money revenues for participants so some interesting situations are lost in the 
game. There are behaviours that individuals are ready to do to double their earnings if they own 
thousand dollars but that they would not accomplish for a few more dollars and a small 
endowment. We shall work with a limited hypothesis according to which individual gives more 
value to its marginal earnings close to the starting point in the game. We call this the decreasing 
utility of money around the local maximum. 
The final hypothesis is about comparison over t h e .  We assume that utility of money is 
consistent in time everything else kept equal. Despite the fact that we compare experirnents 
conducted at different moments during the last twenty years, we have to accept that individuals 
would enjoy the same utility notwithstanding the moment of the experiment. This hypothesis 
makes sense for two reasons. First, experiments are conducted in a relatively short period of 
time going from few weeks to a couple of years and it is plausible to assume that noms and 
values do not change enough in that period to affect significantly the individuals' utility. 
Secondly, our main objective is comparison between different controlled environments. 
Consequently, the absolute difference in results between experiments realized in the early 80's 
and the late 90's is not a problem as long as relative changes in different controlled environment 
are robust to time. We cal1 this hypothesis the consistent utility of money over time. 
Under very general hypotheses, an indirect utility h c t i o n  U,(w,,p*) can also be derived 
from individuals' preferences. In the classical model, Samuelson, using the weak axiom of 
revealed preference, exposed this new way of apprehending rationality by a simple example of 
choice between x, y and z (Samuelson, 1947). Rationality supposes that if an individual chooses 
x over y, the addition of another choice (let Say z) would not change her preference of x over y. 
Also, if x is preferred to y and y is preferred to z, then x must be preferred to z. 
This conclusion has potential flaws. First, on a theoretical basis, feasibility sets can give 
information that changes one's choice. Amartya Sen gives the example of a meeting with 
someone you barely know. If she offers you a tea, suppose you accept (choice a) and drop the 
option of leaving while refusing the invitation (choice b). Suppose now that you have a third 
option that is taking cocaine with her (choice c). You might change your mind and leave right 
away for home because you don't want to fraternize with a drug-addict (Sen, 1993,496). Basu 
claims that while it is possible to point out some situations where internal consistency seems 
violated, as long as these situations remain marginal it only proves that WARP can be falsified 
(Basu, 2003,38-41). 
Secondly, internal consistency supposes that, facing exactly the same choice set, a 
rational individual always makes the same decision. It seems that it is not always the case. 
Quattrone & Tversky did an experiment in 1988 to test the invariance of preference. Two 
representative groups were asked to make a choice between two different policies that had the 
following characteristics: 
Table 1 : The Framing Effet (Ouattrone & Tverskv 1988) 
Group A (N= 126) 
As we can see, these two situations are exactly the same in term of absolute effect. 
Nevertheless, the outcomes were quite different. The authors explained the difference with the 
ratio-difference principle. Individuals calculate changes in ratios instead of absolute values. 
Knowing that ratio of unemployment is 2 for the group A and close to 1 in group B; the authors 
affirm that there is a significant difference for individuals in these two problems because of that. 
Interna1 consistency still stands. 
Group B (N= 133) 
X 
Y 
But the problem with interna1 consistency is that it is useless when in comes to predicting 
Choice 1 Work Force 1 Rate of Inflation 1 Choice 1 Work Force 1 Rate of Inflation 
behaviour. It is impossible to find an equilibrium because no variables can be optimized or 
calibrated. It's like saying that a human is formed with individual cells and then trying to predict 
what he will eat in a fast-food restaurant. We will thus stick to the classical mode1 but treat 
Quattrone & Tversky's findings as a consequence of individuals' calculus limitations. 
Unemployed 
10 % 
5 % 
X=36% of respondents and Y=64% 
Two main conclusions can be derived by this table. First, experimental protocol engineering has 
an effect on free-riding behaviour. These three experiments, while quite similar, had different 
X=54% of respondents and Y=46% 
12'30 
17% 
So, are individuals utility maximizers in their decision? We answer yes but the question 
is then what are they maximizing3. Political scientists will tend to take into account social 
constraints in the maximisation process while economists consider a more individual-centered 
decision by agents. Everybody agrees that some external factors alter the maximisation process. 
Let us compare the results of three experiments4. 
Table 2: Different Characteristics, Different Outcomes 
For a great example of modeling and Pareto optimality in presence of altruism, see Eduardo Ley (1997) 
These numbers were picked from experiments with basically similar in terms of dominant strategies. It does not 
mean that their experimental devices were the same. 
Dawes, Orbe11 & al. (1 986) 
Androeni (1 985) 
Keser, Montmarquette (2003) 
X 
Y 
# of Players 
7 
5 
3 
Employed 
90% 
95% 
1 2% 
17% 
Mean % of Free-riders 
49% 
27%. 
33% 
# of Rounds 
1 
1 O 
1 O0 
settings, group size and number of rounds. Secondly, something is happening that can not be 
explained by the classical microeconomic model. We argue that this flows from subjective 
probability calculus. 
Free-riding, Altruism and Fairness 
One of the most common critics of the rational actor theory concerns the negligence of 
noms and values in the analysis of choice and behaviour. According to the critics, these values 
have a significant impact on individuals that cannot be taken into account by the usual forma1 
models. Altruism, catharsis and fairness are good examples of psychological mechanisms that 
are shaped by these norms and values. Dennis Chong considers that rational choice would have 
better explanatory value if two assurnptions were incorporated in our model. First, individual 
calculations of self-interest weigh social pressures and incentives alongside more tangible 
material factors. Second, current interests are contingent on past decisions (Chong, 2000, 13- 
14). His first assumption is present in society but uneasily replicable in laboratory. It is part of 
the group size specification problem. His second assumption is that individuals are shaped by 
their past experience. As we will see in our discussion about subjective calculus, it is desirable 
to include a lag process in our behaviour prediction model. 
Questions about norms and values are common in political science but rarely discussed in 
economics. While economists put the emphasis on what drives individuals' behaviour, political 
scientists are more preoccupied by constraints imposed by institutions and social pressure. 
Experimental economics provides a nice tool to calibrate the importance of social constraint 
versus self-interest, but there is a clear risk of tautology in incorporating social parameters in 
utility maximization and researchers must be sure to mark a difference between exogenous 
benefits and endogenous utility gained by an individual while participating to the common good. 
It is evident that reciprocity is present in society. Ostrom's work on farmers' mutual 
help, Putnam's research on non-profit organizations and multiple field studies in anthropology 
showed how human beings naturally encourage and reward such behaviour. Experiments 
conducted by the CIRANO conclude that individual tends to cooperate significantly more if they 
experienced cooperation in the previous rounds (Keser, 2003, 22). However, it is not always 
clear why people act like that. Keser and Montmarquette don? clearly distinguish between 
confusion (gambler's fallacy) and kindness. 
It is indeed hard to measure the real impact of sincere kindness and simple confusion. As 
a matter of fact, they both decrease free-riding but for different reasons. To solve this problem, 
Andreoni crafted an experimental protocol to measure non-exclusive kindness and confusion 
(Andreoni, 1995). He tested three experimental designs where different levels of information 
and different incentives. Andreoni argued that as participant gets fmstrated by others' behaviour 
after a few rounds [5-81 they tended to free-ride more (decay phenomenon). We observe an 
increase in "kindness" at the end because slow learners would try cooperation before fiee-riding. 
Figure 1: Andreoni's Measure of Confusion and Kindness 
- -A- - Confusion 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
Round 
A brief review of literature has shown that free-riding is not the mle in experiments 
because individuals have values and social noms profoundly integrated in their lives. However, 
we must not forget that free-riding is still present and is a very common behaviour. Some would 
Say experimental designs are crafted to encourage fiee-riding but social scientists try to replicate 
real life situations in their experiments and every day life is full of incentives toward cheating 
and shirking. In fact, experiments give more latitude to cooperation than it is usually the case 
because the relative triviality of issues at stake encourages altruism. 
In our model, individuals gain utility fiom private and public consumption with a 
preference for the first type. They are also affected by framing and integrated social norms. In 
the last part of this paper, we argue that the main reason why individuals do not play Nash is 
subjective calculus. We argue that social norms, values, framing effect and reciprocity are the 
fmits of cognitive reflexes rationally constructed by individuals. 
As we have seen in the previous section, a rational actor compares expected utility fiom 
different outcomes and makes a choice to maximize this expected utility. We've also seen that 
under the assumption of concavity of utility function, the rational actor is risk averse that is she 
prefers a certain outcome y to an uncertain one z if these two outcomes deliver the same utility. 
A risk premium will be necessary to change her decision. Kahneman has s h o w  twenty-five 
years ago that individuals behave differently when facing a risk of losing or a chance of winning. 
To assure consistency, we have to assume strict convexity of utility function for negative utility 
(losses). While it is not always clear why inconsistency is present, we argue that a large part of it 
is due to subjective calculus. We argue that three kinds of cognitive mechanisms affect human 
behaviour: preconceived ideas, past social experiences and calculus capabilities. 
Preconceived Ideas 
The rational actor mode1 argues that an individual is capable of measuring different 
outcomes' probabilities in a satisfactory way. Individuals' criticalness calculus and efficiency of 
their probabilistic calculations are the major features of probabilistic calculus. Dawes & al. 
made an experiment in 1986 where they investigated the factors organizing collective action 
(Dawes, 1986). Groups of seven persons were formed and each person was given 5$ at the 
beginning and offered to participate in a public good provision game that needed a certain level 
of participation (5) and could earn 10$ to each participant. 
Three devices were then tested on different groups. In the first device, the 5$ was lost if 
not enough persons participated to the public good provision (Standard dilemma). In the second 
one, subjects were guaranteed to receive their money back in case of collective failure but could 
still free-ride on others (Money-back guarantee). In the final group, the maximum payment 
acceptable was 10$ so if an individual tried to free-ride to get 15$, she would lose 5$ (Enforced 
contribution). There was no pecuniary reason to free-ride in this device. Contribution was going 
from around 65% in the standard dilemma and the money-back guarantee device to 93% in the 
enforced contribution device. Using Amnon Rapoport's (1985) paper, the authors defined the 
probability of being futile (p) as the probability of insufficient participation of the others that 
causes provision failure, the probability of being critical (7) and (1-pz) the probability of being 
redundant as enough participants, excluding one self, contribute to the public good provision. 
Participants were then asked the three following questions: 
1. What is the likelihood offewer than four others choosing to invest, that is' to suy, one, two, three 
other members of the experiment? 
2. What is the likelihood of exactly four others choosing to invest? 
3. What is the likelihood of more thun ,four others choosing to invest, that is to say, Jive or al1 six 
of the other members of the experiments? 
Surprisingly, cooperators did not perceive themselves as more critical in the provision process 
than defectors in the standard dilemma and the money-back guarantee devices (Dawes, 1986, 
1 180). For the enforced contribution device, defectors were more inclined to feel futile while CO- 
operators had the same feeling about the redundancy. There is however a clear general pattern 
about free-riders: Notwithstanding the type of mechanism in place, they were clearly more 
pessimistic about the likelihood of the collective good being provided. 
Table 3: Experiments on perceived criticalness (Dawes & al. 1986) 
Standard Dilemma Cooperators 
Standard Dilemma Defectors 
Money-back Guarantee Cooperators 
Money-back Guarantee Defectors 
Enforces Contribution Cooperators 
Enforces Contribution Defectors 
Average probability Average probability 
of being futile or of being critical 
Even though it is not clear why these numbers don't corroborate with mathematical probabilities, 
these experirnents give us some interesting results. First, people seem to free-ride more when 
they are asked about different outcome probabilities (results not shown here). Secondly, as 
argued by the authors, fi-ee-riders are more affected by their perceived chances of making more 
money than by their perceived probability of being suckered as shown by the absence of 
difference between the first and the second devices. 
How long does it take for individuals to l e m  how to maximize their earnings? Using a 
series of pooled experiments conducted under James Andreoni's direction5, we simulated the 
average predicted probability of playing Nash equilibrium in a classic non-cooperative game and 
the average percentage of public consumption for every round (See Appendices A and B). It 
would have been interesting to observe more rounds but a simple conclusion can nevertheless be 
drawn from this figure: People l e m  fast. Zaller (1992) in his classic book on public opinion 
affirmed that individual's opinion was the weighted balance of divergent considerations. In 
We are deeply grateful to James Andreoni who made available al1 his data on his web page: 
www.ssc.wisc.edu~-andreonil 
experimental economics, information takes the form of a dichotomic failure/success variable and 
after few rounds cold calculus overwhelms preconceived ideas on human nature. 
Figure 2: Playing Nash Equilibrium (Andreoni 1988) 
A Probit Simulation 
Round 
In a nutshell, preconceived ideas do have a significant impact on participants' behaviour 
even though successive failures in the provision of the public good quickly convince participant 
to adjust their cognitive proxy. 
Past Social Ex~eriences 
It is difficult to evaluate the impact of past social experiences in experimental 
economics. Some researchers have tried to simulate this factor by exposing participants to short 
stories about good and bad behaviour (Rabin, 1998). This method is not correct because it 
becomes impossible to differentiate between framing effects (Quattrone, 1988) and cognitive 
effects. Indeed, exposition to fresh information could affect individual's behaviour on the short 
term and modiSl his choice. We believe this effect does exist but is independent to the long-term 
effect. In order to evaluate the effect of past social experiences on contribution to a public go04 
we used the 2000 Canadian Electoral Study to measure the impact of past social experiences on 
the provision of the collective actionpar excellence: voting. Our probit mode1 is: 
Vote = Qo + QI *Volunteering + Qz*Religiosiîy + Qj*Work + Qd*Couple + Qs*Sex + Q6*Education 
+ Q7*Interest + Qs*Party IdentrJication + Qg*Age + Qlo*West + QII *Quebec + Q12*Maritimes 
Where Volunteer is a additive scale (O to 1) made from a series of question about participation to 
costly collective action (Helping a candidate, join a boycott, attend a lawful demonstration, join 
an illegal strike, occupy a building or a factoiy) and Vote is a dummy 0-1 (O=vote, 
l=abstention). We controlled for socio-demographic characteristics (having or not a job, sex, 
high school education, religiosity, age, region) and persona1 disposition toward politics (interest 
in politics, party identification). 
Table 4: Probit Estimation of Vote and Abstention 
Independent Variables 
Volunteering 
Interest 
Work 
Couple 
Female 
High School Education 
Religiosity 
Party Identification 
Age 
West 
Quebec 
Maritimes 
Constant 
N = 506 
Log Likelihood = -1 78.96625 
Pseudo-FU = 0.1279 
* 5% level of signzficance * * 1 % level of signzjicance 
Robust Coefficients 
l.5223** 
(0.5069) 
0.1000** 
(0.028 1) 
0.2907 
(0.2076) 
-0.0060 
(O. 1662) 
-0.0564 
(O. 1538) 
O. 1502 
(O. 1945) 
0.1216 
(O. 18%) 
O. 1 O83 
(0.1817) 
0.0135" 
(0.0055) 
0.5945** 
(0.2009) 
0.5017* 
(O. 1986) 
0.0067 
(0.2156) 
-1 .O457* 
(0.4292) 
We found that past volunteering has a positive and significant effect on vote. Those who 
had experienced collective action before were more likely to vote6. Rational choice literature has 
always consider voting an irrational activity for the self-interested actor (Downs, 1957) but past 
During the 2000 federal election, only 62.8% of eligible Canadians went to the polls (Elections Canada). 
Respondents to the CES survey said in a proportion of 74% îhat they intended to vote. Our results are thus 
conservative. 
social experiences without consideration about success or failure of these experiences seems to 
incite individuals to diverge from their best strategy. We also found a significant and positive 
relation between interest in politics and attitude toward voting. This makes sense since those 
who are interested in politics are more affected by "sense of duty" and by the importance of 
"saving democracy". Older people are also more likely to vote than young citizens. However, 
we found that some collective action consumers (married people and churchgoers in this case) 
were not less likely to free-ride in the election. This result is compatible with our assumption 
first argued by Dennis Chong: Individuals weight social pressure when they make a decision 
(Chong, 2000). Marriage and church attendance are in part dictated by social expectations in the 
community and free-riding brings significant costs. It is not necessarily the case for an election. 
We simulated the impact of climbing up the scale of volunteering on probabilities to vote 
or not. We measured this for three levels of interest (0-10) in politics found in the CES survey. 
We found that the impact of past volunteering is particularly important on people not very 
interested in politics (2.5110) but still present when level of interest rises. 
Figure 3: Effect of Past Volunteering on Vote 
O 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1 
Soale of Volunteering 
  ample lnterest in Politics (5.4110) Low lnterest in Politics (2 5/10) -D-High lnterest in Politics (7 5/10) 1 
It seems that for those not very interested in politics, volunteering tends to bring them back to the 
poll. We have shown that past participation in collective action had an effect on individual's 
calculus toward voting but is it also true for smaller group situation where an agent decision is 
critical in the production of the public good? 
Most experiments on provision of public goods take the form of a non-cooperative game. 
Van de Kragt, Orbe11 and Dawes crafted an original device to test how criticalness changes 
participants' behaviour (Van de Kragt, 1983). Groups of seven were formed and were allowed 
to discuss during ten minutes before the experiments. They could decide about a strategy to 
maximize everybody's payoff by contributing just enough to enjoy public good provision. When 
the meeting ended, those who were declared providers were necessarily critical in the provision 
of the good. The authors' main result was that those who had to provide private resources 
actually respected their word and Pareto optimality was reached for a large majority of groups, 
compare with 35% of failure when discussion was prohibited (Ibid, 1983, 1 15). 
The rational actor mode1 would have predicted exactly the contrary. If a participant 
knows that it takes only one cheater to lose the public good and her private contribution, she 
would certainly shirk as al1 other providers. The only reasonable explanation for participation is 
trust toward people. The authors concede that some of the participants knew each other before 
the experiment. But since very low amounts of money were at stake, cheating was not a question 
of life and death. We argue that this experiment is a good example of inference on past events. 
Indeed, these participants used proxies of their life to anticipate others' behaviour. By the same 
logic they cross confidently the street when the light turns green and cars are coming the other 
way, they believe people will play straight and that drivers will stop at the red light. Van de 
Kragt & al. observed the very same phenomenon in laboratories. 
Calculus Ca~abilities 
But how good are individuals' perceptions on a larger scale? In 1993, André Blais and 
Robert Young (2000, 65) distributed questionnaires to students in political science, economics 
and sociology. Students were asked about their perceived chances of being critical in their 1993 
riding. It is quite difficult to estimate that kind of probability in a first-past-the-pole system but 
Blais and Young estimated around 1 out of 45,000. 36% of the students answered somewhere 
close to the right category while 27% overestimated it and 23% said they didn't have any idea. 
Unfortunately, the gross nature of this estimation doesn't allow a clear conclusion. We can at 
least affirm that there is miscalculation among a large scale group because despite some two 
hundred years of democratic life in the Western hemisphere, strategic voting survives and voters 
are still looking for a vote that counts (Cox, 1997). 
Since Mancur Olson's Logzc of Collective Action, the most common explanation of the 
effect of number on the outcome of a collective action is that beyond a critical mass of 
individuals, self-interest drives a rational calculator to fiee-ride on the assumption that her 
participation on the cost-burden associated with the production of a public good is insignificant. 
More precisely, Olson's thesis is: 
Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or 
some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests. In other words, even fa11 of 
the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and would gain tf; as a group, 
they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntary act to achieve 
that common or group interest (Olson, 1965). 
Using the market as an illustration of his thesis, Olson affirms that, like small firms who 
would benefit from price collusion, individuals in a group have the same interest in cooperation 
with other members. The problem is with the incentive to cheat on others. Why share the costs 
of the collective action if you can dodge them? Marwell and Oliver reckon the presence of fiee- 
riding but they argue that a large group don't always lead to a collective failure. They believe 
that the level of heterogeneity can save a collective action from disaster (Marwell, 1993, 51). 
Large group heterogeneity of preference would induce "exploitation of the great by the small". 
Individuals with intense preference for the collective action will pay a much larger part of the 
costs and allow indifferent individuals to fiee-ride. 
We argue that the size of a group is not intrinsically a factor when it comes to voluntary 
public good provision. Voting, the most common and widespread form of collective action, is 
generally performed by a large part of the population without significant distinction between 
heterogeneous (United States, Canada, Spain) and homogeneous countries (France, Ireland). As 
we have seen earlier, perception of criticalness, communication and cost burden affect directly 
the outcome while group size effect comes earlier in the process and affect indirectly the final 
outcome. The interesting question however is how these factors evolve as size increases. This is 
a major and unanswered question. 
As we have seen earlier with Andreoni's measure of confusion and kindness, participants 
do make important and durable mistakes when they choose their best strategy. Andreoni wanted 
to know if contribution at a sub-optimal level was due to kindness or confusion. So he tested 
different mechanisms of payoff going fiom classical pay-as-you-earn to more complex ones with 
ranking. In his classical experiment, each subject was given 60 units to share between a private 
and a public good. Using cominon hypotheses about the utility given to private and public 
goods, he fixed to one cent the value of one unit of private consumption and half a cent for 
public good. Andreoni noted that during the furst round of play, 20 percent of participants did 
what was their utility-maximizing strategy following a classical microeconomic model: fiee-ride. 
Was it another example of rational actor model limitations or only noise arising out of 
confusion? 
The answer is not clear. As experiments continue, individuals' behaviour changed in 
favour of free-riding. Did these people l e m  how to play the game efficiently or was it simply 
frustration toward free-riders that drove them? His results are not completely convincing but it is 
clear that, purged from the effect of kindness, the results still show divergence from Nash 
equilibrium. It has al1 the characteristics of confusion we would have needed more information 
about individuals' perceptions before and after the game to confirm Andreoni's assumptions. 
We have argued in this paper that classical assumptions about rational actor are not 
efficient when it comes to explaining political and economic choices. Among endogenous 
factors affecting individuals' behaviour, subjective calculus plays a significant role. 
Preconceived ideas, inference fiom past experiences and calculus limitations play an important 
role in the cognitive process. But how can we take these new variables into account in forrnal 
analysis? The answer is not simple but a first step would be to estimate their effects and to 
weigh their roles in the dynamic process. More experiments will be needed to succeed in that 
task. 1 propose a protocol that could help move fonvard in our exploration of choice 
mechanisms. 
An ideal experiment would be done in three steps. First, an exhaustive questionnaire 
should be distributed to each participant. Questions about socio-demographic variables (sex, 
education, age, social background) would be included in it. Also, the questionnaire should 
include a long series of question on probabilities under different devices (chances of being 
critical, success of the enterprise, risk averseness, etc.) to estimate participants' calculus 
capabilities and limitations. A third section should include questions about past experiences in 
everyday life (Have you ever been stolen by somebody you trusted?, If you were lost in a 
unfamilia city, would you ask for help on the street?, etc.). Finally, the questionnaire should 
include some questions about the predicted outcomes of the game and about expected behaviour 
of the others participants. But what if this questionnaire has an effect on participant's behaviour 
by making them think differently than in their real life? A control group should be set up to 
measure this effect. 
During the experiments, average earning and public consumption in the previous rounds 
should be given to each participant to allow learning during the game. An ideal game should last 
100 periods or more and the participants should not be aware of how much more rounds they 
will play. We would thus purge the results from artificial end-game decay. Finally, some 
individuals should be told that they are playing with three, five, 20 or a hundred players so we 
could control for the group size effect. Some participants could also play against computers to 
analyze the consequence of rationalizability. After the experiment, another questionnaire should 
be distributed to collect information about strategies employed by players during the game and 
what made them chose theses strategies (sense of duty, money, etc.). Some of these suggestions 
have been tested in previous research conducted at CIRANO but we believe the complete 
protocol should be tested to judge its validity. 
Experimental economics allowed the development of a whole new field of research. This 
methodology, as al1 others, has its limitations and flaws. However, working in a controlled 
environment allows a huge range of possibilities with relatively limited resources. We believe 
political scientists and economists should use these possibilities to test and calibrate their 
models. Modem econometrics and formal methodology can merge with experimental social 
science to explain political and economic choices in a new and better way. 
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